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The Right to Refuse Treatment: A Model Act
BY THE
LEGAL ADVISORS COMMITTEE,* CONCERN FOR DYING
Abstract: Although the right to refuse medical treatment is
universally recognized as a fundamental principle of liberty, this
right is not always honored. A refusal can be thwarted either
because a patient is unable to competently communicate or because
providers insist on continuing treatment. To help enhance the
patient's right to refuse treatment, many states have enacted so-
called "living will" or "natural death" statutes. We believe the time
Introduction
The most important right that patients possess is the
right of self-determination, the right to make the ultimate
decision concerning what will or will not be done to their
bodies.' This right, embodied in the informed consent doc-
trine, has a critical and essential corollary: the right to refuse
treatment.2 Unless the right to refuse treatment is honored,
the right of self-determination degenerates into a "right" to
agree with one's physician.
Courts have recently declared that both the common
law3 and the United States Constitution4 protect an individ-
ual's right to refuse medical treatment. These decisions
might be seen as arguments against legislation that would
reaffirm and enhance this right since such legislation might
be viewed as either unnecessary or undesirable and confus-
ing. On the other hand, cases continue to recur in which
individuals are treated despite their competent objections or
withdrawal of consent.56 And although courts universally
recognize the patient's right to refuse treatment, they have
differed in their enunciation of the proper standards to be
followed in implementing this right.34,7 We believe the
centrality of the right to refuse treatment makes its periodic
reaffirmation appropriate, and a clear articulation of its
applicability in particular contexts is a proper subject for
legislation.
Living Will and Natural Death Statutes
To help promote the right of self-determination by
preventing unwanted heroic medical interventions, many
commentators have proposed, and 12 states and the District
of Columbia have adopted, so-called "living will" or "natu-
ral death" statutes.8 The primary purpose of these statutes is
to provide competent individuals with a mechanism to set
forth in a document, called a "living will," what they do and
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has come to move beyond these current legislative models, and we
therefore propose a Model Act that clearly enunciates an individ-
ual's right to refuse treatment, does not limit its exercise to the
terminally ill or to heroic measures, and provides a mechanism by
which individuals can set forth their wishes in advance and desig-
nate another person to enforce them. (Am J Public Health 1983;
73:918-921.)
do not want done to them in case they become mentally
incompetent and require medical intervention to keep them
alive.
The rationale is that, with the advent of more effective
medical technology, patients may have their lives prolonged
painfully, expensively, fruitlessly, and against their wills. By
signing a prior statement, the patient hopes to avoid a
technological imperative which commands that that which
can be done, must be done, and instead keep some control
over his or her medical treatment.
Although specific provisions of these statutes vary, a
typical statute allows patients to direct the withholding or
withdrawal of medical treatment in the event the patient
becomes terminally ill. Most current "living will" statutes
basically permit physicians to honor a terminally ill patient's
directive not to be treated if the physician agrees that
treatment is not indicated. This, of course, can be done in
the absence of any statute2 9-"; and the current statutes do
not so much enhance patients' rights as they enhance
provider privileges (i.e., physicians typically are granted
immunity if they follow a patient's directive, but are not
required to follow it if they do not want to). 12-20
Previous Model Acts
Model statutes suggested by other commentators have
been of three basic kinds: 1) syntheses of the best features of
existing legislation and proposals2'-23; 2) proposals to extend
the right to refuse treatment to nonterminally ill patients24;
and 3) proposals to permit the individual to designate anoth-
er person to make the treatment decisions when the individ-
ual is unable to make them.2526 We believe all of these
efforts are laudatory, and have attempted to incorporate in
our own model the best of each current proposal. However,
we also believe it is time to move beyond the limitations of
"living will" and "natural death" legislation, and propose a
model that incorporates all the features necessary in what
might be considered "second generation" legislation. Such
legislation:
* should not be restricted to the terminally ill, but
should apply to all competent adults and mature
minors;
* should not limit the types of treatment an individual
can refuse (e.g., to "extraordinary" treatment) but
should apply to all medical interventions;
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* should permit individuals to designate another person
to act on their behalf and set forth the criteria under
which the designated person is to make decisions;
* should require health care providers to follow the
patient's wishes and provide sanctions for those who
do not do so;
* should require health care providers to continue to
provide palliative care to patients who refuse other
interventions.
The Model Legislation
The specific provisions of our proposal are set forth in
the Appendix to this article. Many of the sections are self-
explanatory, but some merit additional comment. No specif-
ic form or document is included because we believe the
individual's wishes will be more likely to be set forth if their
own words are used.
It should be stressed initially that the right being reaf-
firmed is the right to refuse treatment implicit in any
meaningful concept of individual liberty. Living will stat-
utes, on the other hand, usually rely on a vaguely articulated
"right to die" which has no legal pedigree. We include both
adults and mature minors in the purview of the Act because
we believe minors who understand the nature and conse-
quences of their actions should not be forced to undergo
medical treatment against their will.
Competence
The definitions seek to clarify the scope of the right by
including all "competent" individuals who can understand
the nature and consequences of their decisions. Thus while
mature minors and previously competent individuals are
included, individuals who have never been competent or
who did not express their wishes while competent are not
within the scope of the proposal. The competent person's
understanding must be attested to by two adult witnesses at
the time a written declaration is executed, or be determined
at the time of an oral refusal. While the Act's definition of
competence is consistent with the law of most states on this
subject, hospitals may wish to develop objective criteria,
procedures, and documentation requirements to assess com-
petency accurately.
The competence standard used is a functional one,
based on the individual's ability to give informed consent. It
rejects any notion that a patient's decision must be consist-
ent with the "medically rational choice" as defined by the
physician. Competence is the crucial issue, since a lack of
competence, or even the questioning of an individual's
competence, deprives the individual of the power to make
treatment decisions.
For example, in Lane v. Candura, a 77-year-old woman
refused to permit amputation of her gangrenous leg. Her
physician believed that this decision, which would lead to
her death, was medically irrational, and that Mrs. Candura
was incompetent.27 As is often the case, Mrs. Candura's
competence was not questioned at any time when she agreed
to undergo recommended surgical procedures. The court
noted that Candura's occasional fluctuations in mental lucid-
ity did not affect her basic ability to understand what the
doctor wanted to do and what would happen if he didn't: she
knew that the doctor wanted to amputate her leg, and that he
believed she would otherwise die. The court also clarified
that the competent patient's decision must be respected even
when, as in this case, physicians or others consider it
unfortunate, medically irrational, or misguided. Using these
principles, the court refused to appoint a guardian for Mrs.
Candura since she had exhibited a reasonable appreciation
of the issues surrounding the treatment refusal. Other courts
have validated a competence definition substantially identi-
cal to the one used in this Act.2,283'
The proposed Act aims at protecting the autonomy of
not only terminally ill patients, but those who are not
terminally ill as well. If we do not raise our sensitivity
regarding respect for the nonterminal patient's right to
autonomy, it is extremely unlikely that the rights of terminal
patients will be respected. The Act also applies to patients
like Karen Ann Quinlan who, while in a hopeless, persistent
vegetative state, do not suffer from an underlying, terminal
illness.
Designating a Proxy
The President's Commission for the Study of Ethical
Problems in Medicine has recently noted that "by combining
a proxy directive with specific instructions, an individual
could control both the content and the process of decision-
making about care in case of incapacity."32 Concern for
Dying's Act incorporates this suggestion by permitting the
declarant to both define what interventions are refused, and
to name an authorized individual to make decisions consist-
ent with the declarant's desires as expressed in the declara-
tion. Thirty-seven states currently have durable power of
attorney laws that arguably permit such a designation,
provided that the individual gives specific authorization
regarding medical treatment. However, these statutes were
passed long before living wills became an issue, and although
we believe courts should honor medical decisions made by a
proxy named under a durable power of attorney statute,
there have been no reported cases on this issue to date.32.33
There is no time limit to the validity of declarations, just
as there is no time limit on ordinary wills or on donations
made under Uniform Anatomical Gift Acts. The primary
protection regarding the authenticity of the wishes of a
person is the requirement for two witnesses to certify that
they believe the person understood what he was signing and
did it voluntarily. We have not restricted the individuals who
can be either witnesses or authorized persons (e.g., the
attending physician or relatives who might benefit under a
will are not excluded because we think this unnecessarily
implies bad faith on the part of categories of individuals and
unnecessarily restricts the autonomy of a person to choose
his own proxy and witnesses). Further, criminal penalties
exist for falsification and forgery, and, if a physician or
relative wants to harm the declarant, there are much easier
ways to do it than by utilizing this mechanism. A second
protection for the declarant is that revocation of a declara-
tion is made easy. But the intent to revoke must be specific.
Merely signing a blanket hospital admissions form that
"consents" to whatever treatment physicians at the hospital
wish to render is insufficient indication of revocation of a
declaration.
Responsibility of Providers
The Model Act further clarifies that refusal of treatment
does not terminate the physician-patient relationship, and
that a physician who declines to follow the patient's wishes
must transfer the patient to a physician who will. The Act
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recognizes that some providers may have different belief or
value systems from the people they care for as patients, and
attempts to establish a realistic procedure which allows the
ethical views of both parties to be respected. However, the
Act also recognizes that the patient is most immediately
affected by failure to carry out a treatment-refusal decision,
since the patient's own future and quality of life are at stake.
Consequently, when a patient's directive and provider's
views differ, the patient's directive must prevail over the
physician's views on the rare occasions where transfer is
impossible.
Providers who follow the procedures outlined in this
Act are relieved of liability pursuant to any civil, criminal, or
administrative action. However, providers who abandon
their patients or refuse to comply with valid declarations are
subject to sanctions. They may face civil actions including
charges of negligence and battery. Administrative sanctions
may include license revocation, suspension, or other disci-
plinary action by the state board of professional registration.
Other sections of the Act make it clear that this method
of refusing treatment is not exclusive, but in addition to any
other methods recognized by law; that the refusal of treat-
ment is not suicide; that a treatment refusal does not affect
any insurance policy; and that regardless of refusals, pallia-
tive care must be given unless specifically refused by the
patient himself.
Summary
In summary, this model Right to Refuse Treatment Act
clearly enunciates the competent person's right to refuse
treatment, does not limit the exercise of this right to termi-
nally ill patients or to extraordinary or heroic measures, and
provides a mechanism by which a competent person can
declare his or her intentions concerning treatment in the
event of future incompetence, and can name another person
to enforce this declaration.
The Act is designed to promote autonomy and respect
for persons, by enhancing the individual's right to accept or
reject medical treatments recommended by health care pro-
viders. It protects all competent persons, and incompetent
persons who executed a declaration while they were compe-
tent. It provides that individuals may execute a written,
signed declaration setting forth their intentions on treatment
and refusal decisions and permits them to designate autho-
rized individuals to make treatment decisions on their be-
half, should they become incompetent in the future. The Act
expresses, upholds, and clarifies recognized patient rights to
autonomy and inviolability, recognition of which accords
with the ethics of the medical profession; shields complying
physicians, witnesses, and authorized persons acting in good
faith, from liability; and provides sanctions for those who
violate its provisions.
It has been almost three-quarters of a century since
Judge Benjamin Cardozo wrote, regarding medical care that,
"Every human being of adult years has a right to determine
what shall be done with his own body.''4 Today's medical
care would be incomprehensible to a physician practicing
when these words were written. Nonetheless, medicine's
success in radically improving its ability to prolong life has
made the right of self-determination an even more vital
principle. By proposing this Act, the Legal Advisors of
Concern for Dying reaffirm the right to self-determination in
the hope that the discussion fostered will enhance the liberty
of all citizens.
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APPENDIX
RIGHT TO REFUSE TREATMENT ACT
Section 1. Definitions
"Competent person" shall mean an individual who is able to understand
and appreciate the nature and consequences of a decision to accept or refuse
treatment.
"Declaration" shall mean a written statement executed according to the
provisions of this Act which sets forth the declarant's intentions with respect
to medical procedures, treatment or nontreatment, and may include the
declarant's intentions concerning palliative care.
"Declarant" shall mean an individual who executes a declaration under
the provisions of this Act.
"Health care provider" shall mean a person, facility or institution
licensed or authorized to provide health care.
"Incompetent person" shall mean a person who is unable to understand
and appreciate the nature and consequences of a decision to accept or refuse
treatment.
"Medical procedure or treatment" shall mean any action taken by a
physician or health care provider designed to diagnose, assess, or treat a
disease, illness, or injury. These include, but are not limited to, surgery,
drugs, transfusions, mechanical ventilation, dialysis, resuscitation, artificial
feeding, and any other medical act designed for diagnosis, assessment or
treatment.
"Palliative care" shall mean any measure taken by a physician or health
care provider designed primarily to maintain the patient's comfort. These
include, but are not limited to, sedatives and pain-killing drugs; non-artificial,
oral feeding; suction; hydration; and hygienic care.
"Physician" shall mean any physician responsible for the declarant's
care.
Section 2.
A competent person has the right to refuse any medical procedure or
treatment, and any palliative care measure.
Section 3.
A competent person may execute a declaration directing the withholding
or withdrawal of any medical procedure or treatment or any palliative care
measure, which is in use or may be used in the future in the person's medical
care or treatment, even if continuance of the medical procedure or treatment
could prevent or postpone the person's death from being caused by the
person's disease, illness or injury. The declaration shall be in writing, dated
and signed by the declarant in the presence of two adult witnesses. The two
witnesses must sign the declaration, and by their signatures indicate they
believe the declarant's execution of the declaration was understanding and
voluntary.
Section 4.
If a person is unable to sign a declaration due to a physical impairment,
the person may execute a declaration by communicating agreement after the
declaration has been read to the person in the presence of the two adult
witnesses. The two witnesses must sign the declaration, and by their
signatures indicate the person is physically impaired so as to be unable to sign
the declaration, that the person understands the declaration's terms, and that
the person voluntarily agrees to the terms of the declaration.
Section 5.
A declarant shall have the right to appoint in the declaration a person
authorized to order the administration, withholding, or withdrawal of medical
procedures and treatment in the event that the declarant becomes incompe-
tent. A person so authorized shall have the power to enforce the provisions of
the declaration and shall be bound to exercise this authority consistent with
the declaration and the authorized person's best judgment as to the actual
desires and preferences of the declarant. No palliative care measure may be
withheld by an authorized person unless explicitly provided for in the
declaration. Physicians and health care providers caring for incompetent
declarants shall provide such authorized persons all medical information
which would be available to the declarant if the declarant were competent.
Section 6.
Any declarant may revoke a declaration by destroying or defacing it,
executing a written revocation, making an oral revocation, or by any other act
evidencing the declarant's specific intent to revoke the declaration.
Section 7.
A competent person who orders the withholding or withdrawal of
treatment shall receive appropriate palliative care unless it is expressly stated
by the person orally or through a declaration that the person refuses palliative
care.
Section 8.
This act shall not impair or supersede a person's legal right to direct the
withholding or withdrawal of medical treatment or procedures in any other
manner recognized by law.
Section 9.
No person shall require anyone to execute a declaration as a condition of
enrollment, continuation, or receipt of benefits for disability, life, health or
any other type of insurance. The withdrawal or withholding of medical
procedures or treatment pursuant to the provisions of this Act shall not affect
the validity of any insurance policy, and shall not constitute suicide.
Section 10.
This Act shall create no presumption concerning the intention of a person
who has failed to execute a declaration. The fact that a person has failed to
execute a declaration shall not constitute evidence of that person's intent
concerning treatment or nontreatment.
Section 1 1.
A declaration made pursuant to this Act, an oral refusal by a person, or a
refusal of medical procedures or treatment through an authorized person,
shall be binding on all physicians and health care providers caring for the
declarant.
Section 12.
A physician who fails to comply with a written or oral declaration and to
make necessary arrangements to transfer the declarant to another physician
who will effectuate the declaration shall be subject to civil liability and
professional disciplinary action, including license revocation or suspension.
When acting in good faith to effectuate the terms of a declaration or when
following the direction of an authorized person appointed in a declaration
under Section 5, no physician or health care provider shall be liable in any
civil, criminal, or administrative action for withholding or withdrawing any
medical procedure, treatment, or palliative care measure. When acting in
good faith, no witness to a declaration, or person authorized to make
treatment decisions under Section 5, shall be liable in any civil, criminal, or
administrative action.
Section 13.
A person found guilty of willfully concealing a declaration, or falsifying or
forging a revocation of a declaration, shall be subject to criminal prosecution
for a misdemeanor [the class or type of misdemeanor is left to the determina-
tion of individual state legislatures].
Section 14.
Any person who falsifies or forges a declaration. or who willfully
conceals or withholds information concerning the revocation of a declaration,
with the intent to cause a withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining
procedures from a person, and who thereby causes life-sustaining procedures
to be withheld or withdrawn and death to be hastened, shall be subject to
criminal prosecution for a felony [the class or type of felony is left to the
determination of individual state legislatures].
Section 15.
If any provision or application of this Act is held invalid, this invalidity
shall not affect other provisions or applications of the Act which can be given
effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the
provisions of this Act are severable.
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